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Abstract. Bitcoin is designed to protect user anonymity (or pseudonymity)
in a financial transaction, and has been increasingly adopted by major e-
commerce websites such as Dell, PayPal and Expedia. While the anonymity
of Bitcoin transactions has been extensively studied, little attention has been
paid to the security of post-transaction correspondence. In a commercial ap-
plication, the merchant and the user often need to engage in follow-up corre-
spondence after a Bitcoin transaction is completed, e.g., to acknowledge the
receipt of payment, to confirm the billing address, to arrange the product de-
livery, to discuss refund and so on. Currently, such follow-up correspondence
is typically done in plaintext via email with no guarantee on confidentiality.
Obviously, leakage of sensitive data from the correspondence (e.g., billing ad-
dress) can trivially compromise the anonymity of Bitcoin users. In this paper,
we initiate the first study on how to realise end-to-end secure communica-
tion between Bitcoin users in a post-transaction scenario without requiring
any trusted third party or additional authentication credentials. This is an
important new area that has not been covered by any IEEE or ISO/IEC se-
curity standard, as none of the existing PKI-based or password-based AKE
schemes are suitable for the purpose. Instead, our idea is to leverage the Bit-
coin’s append-only ledger as an additional layer of authentication between
previously confirmed transactions. This naturally leads to a new category of
AKE protocols that bootstrap trust entirely from the block chain. We call this
new category “Bitcoin-based AKE” and present two concrete protocols: one
is non-interactive with no forward secrecy, while the other is interactive with
additional guarantee of forward secrecy. Finally, we present proof-of-concept
prototypes for both protocols with experimental results to demonstrate their
practical feasibility.
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1 Introduction
Bitcoin [22] is an online currency whose value is not endorsed by any central reserve,
but is based on the perception of its users [15]. In recent years it has surged in value,
reaching a peak of $1147 per bitcoin in December 2013. The currency is supported
by a decentralised network of users whose collective computational power provides a
guarantee of integrity for an append-only ledger. Any attempt to change the ledger’s
history (a history-revision attack [4]) would require an adversary with at least, in
theory 51% of the networks computational resources to be successful1. Several central
banks have evaluated the value of digital currencies and their potential impact on
society [15, 29, 25].
Bitcoin is increasingly being accepted by many e-commerce websites as a form of
payment. For example, Dell, one of the largest computer retailers in the world, now
allows customers to use Bitcoin to pay for online purchases on the Dell website [9].
Recently, PayPal [5] and Expedia [24] have also endorsed support for using Bitcoin.
Similarly, many community-driven organisations allow anonymous donations using
Bitcoin. Examples include the TOR project [27], Mozilla Foundation [21] and the
Calyx Institute [18],
While Bitcoin is designed to support anonymity (or pseudonymity) in a transac-
tion, little attention has been paid to the anonymity in the post-payment scenario.
As with any on-line payment system, the payer and the payee may need to engage in
follow-up correspondence after the payment has been made, e.g., to acknowledge the
receipt, to confirm billing information, to amend discrepancies in the order if there
are any and to agree on the product delivery or pick-up. Such correspondence can
involve privacy-sensitive information, which, if leaked to a third party, may trivially
reveal the identity of the user involved in the earlier transaction (e.g., information
about product delivery may contain the home address).
Currently, the primary mechanism to support follow-up correspondence after a
Bitcoin transaction is through email. The Dell website requires shoppers to pro-
vide their email address when making a Bitcoin payment to facilitate post-payment
correspondence. The Calyx Institute, a non-profit research organization dedicated
to providing “privacy by design for everyone”, also recommends using e-mails for
follow-up correspondence after a donation is made in Bitcoin. On its website, the
instruction is given as the following [18]:
“Note that if you make a donation by Bitcoin, we have no way to connect
the donation with your email address. If you would like us to confirm receipt
of the donation (and send a thank you email!), you’ll need to send an email
with the details of the transaction. Otherwise, you have our thanks for your
support in advance.”
However, emails are merely a communication medium and have no built-in guar-
antees of security. First of all, there is no guarantee that the sender of the email must
be the same person who made the Bitcoin payment. The details of the transaction
cannot serve as a means of authentication, since they are publicly available on the
Bitcoin network. Furthermore, today’s emails are usually not encrypted. The content
of an email can be easily read by third parties (e.g., ISPs) during the transit over the
Internet. The leakage of privacy-sensitive information in email can seriously threaten
the anonymity of the user who has made an “anonymous” payment in Bitcoin pre-
viously.
So far the importance of protecting post-payment communication has been largely
neglected in both the Bitcoin and the security research communities. To the best of
1 An adversary may not require 51% of computational power in reality [4, 3, 10].
our knowledge, no solution is available to address this practical problem in the real
world. This is a gap in the field, which we aim to bridge in our work.
One trivial solution is to apply existing Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) pro-
tocols to establish a secure end-to-end (E2E) communication channel between Bitcoin
users. Two general approaches for realising secure E2E communication in cryptog-
raphy include using 1) PKI-based AKE (e.g., HMQV), and 2) Password-based AKE
(e.g., EKE and SPEKE). The former approach would require Bitcoin users to be
part of a global PKI system, with each user holding a public key certificate. This
is not realistic in current Bitcoin applications. The second approach requires Bit-
coin users to have a pre-shared secret password. However, securely distributing pair-
wise shared passwords over the internet is not an easy task. Furthermore, passwords
are a weak form of authentication and they may be easily guessed or stolen (e.g.
by shoulder-surfing). A solution that can provide a stronger form of authentication
without involving any passwords will be desirable.
Following the decentralised and anonymity-driven nature of the Bitcoin network
[17], we propose new AKE protocols to support secure post-payment communication
between Bitcoin users, without requiring any PKI or pre-shared passwords. Our so-
lutions leverage the transaction-specific secrets in the confirmed Bitcoin payments
published on the public blockchain to bootstrap trust in establishing an end-to-end
secure communication channel. Given each party’s transaction history and our AKE
protocols, both parties are guaranteed to be speaking to the other party who was
involved in the transactions, without revealing their real identities.
Contributions. Our contributions in this paper are summarised below.
– We propose two authenticated key exchange protocols – one interactive and the
other non-interactive – using transaction-specific secrets and without the support
of a trusted third party to establish end-to-end secure communication. These are
new types of AKE protocols, since they bootstrap trust from Bitcoin’s public
ledger instead of a PKI or shared passwords.
– We provide proof-of-concept implementations for both protocols in the Bitcoin
Core client with performance measurements. Our experiments suggest that these
protocols are feasible for practical use in real-world Bitcoin applications.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains
the background of Bitcoin and the ECDSA signature that is used for authenticating
Bitcoin transactions. Section 3 proposes two protocols to allow post-payment secure
communication between users based on their transaction history. One protocol is
non-interactive with no forward secrecy, while the other is interactive with the addi-
tional guarantee of forward secrecy. Security proofs for both protocols are provided
in Section 4. Section 5 describes the proof-of-concept implementations for both pro-
tocols and reports the performance measurements. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Background
In this section, we will provide brief background information about the Bitcoin pro-
tocol, the transaction signature and the underlying Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
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Fig. 1. Transactions stored on the Blockchain based on [19]
Algorithm (ECDSA). This information will be needed for understanding the two
protocols presented in this paper.
2.1 Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a digital currency that allows a network of nodes to access a public ledger
and to agree upon append-only changes periodically. We will outline the three main
mechanisms in the Bitcoin protocol which include Bitcoin addresses, transactions and
the Blockchain. Together, they allow users to identify each other pseudonymously,
transfer bitcoins and record the transaction in the public ledger.
Each user is responsible for generating their Bitcoin address, which is simply
the hash of an ECDSA public key. The corresponding private key is required to
spend bitcoins. This approach for user identification is considered appropriate as the
probability that two users generate the same public key is negligible due to the high
number of possible ECDSA public keys.
A common belief in the community is that Bitcoin offers pseudonymity that can
help disguise their real-world identity due to the random nature of ECDSA public
keys. This belief is bolstered as users are recommended to create a new Bitcoin ad-
dress per transaction to increase the difficulty of tracking their transactions. However,
it should be noted that Bitcoin was not designed with anonymity in mind [23] and
studies have shown with limited success that it is possible to link Bitcoin addresses
to real-world identities [26, 3, 23].
Transactions are created by users to send bitcoins. All transactions are sent to
the network and its correctness is verified by other peers before it is accepted into the
public ledger. Each transaction has a list of ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’. The output states
the new owner’s bitcoin address and the quantity to be transferred. The input will
contain a signature to authorise the payment and a reference to a previous transaction
whereby the user received the bitcoins. Figure 1 highlights how transactions are
linked, which allows peers to perform the verification, by comparing the received
transaction with their local copy of the ledger.
Algorithm 1 ECDSA Signature Generation algorithm [11]
Input: Domain parameters D = (q, P, n,Curve), private key d, message m.
Output: Signature (r, s).
1: Select k ∈R [1, n− 1].
2: Compute kP = (x1, y1) where x1 ∈R [0, q − 1]
3: Compute r = x1 mod n. If r = 0, then go to Step 1.
4: Compute e = H(m).
5: Compute s = k−1(e+ dr) mod n. If s = 0, then go to Step 1.
6: Return (r, s).
A special ‘miner’ will collect the most recent set of transactions from the network
to form a ‘block’. This block is appended to the longest chain of blocks (Blockchain)
approximately every ten minutes by solving a computationally difficult problem
(proof of work) in return for a subsidy of bitcoins. This append-only ledger has
become a relatively secure time stamp server [7], since reversing transactions that
are committed on the Blockchain is considered infeasible. Figure 1 demonstrates how
transactions are stored aperiodically on the Blockchain.
2.2 Transaction Signature
Figure 1 presented earlier demonstrates that the signature is stored in the input of
a transaction. This signature must be from the Bitcoin address mentioned in the
previous transaction’s output. Briefly, it is important to highlight that the user will
create the transaction, specify the inputs and outputs, hash this transaction and
then sign it using their private key. This prevents an adversary from modifying the
contents of a transaction or claiming ownership of the bitcoins before it is accepted
into the Blockchain.
Bitcoin incorporates the OpenSSL suite to execute the ECDSA algorithm. The
NIST-P256 curve is used and all domain parameters over the finite field including
group order n, generator P and modulus q can be found in [6]. An outline of the
signature generation algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1 to highlight the usage of k
as this will be required for the authenticated key exchange protocols. The verification
algorithm follows what is defined in [13]. The notations and symbols used in our paper
are summarised in Table 1.
3 Key exchange protocols
Key exchange protocols allow two or more participants to derive a shared crypto-
graphic key, often used for authenticated encryption. In this section we will present
two authenticated key exchange protocols: Diffie-Hellman-over-Bitcoin and YAK-
over-Bitcoin. These protocols will take advantage of a random nonce k from an
ECDSA signature. Our aim is to achieve transaction-level authentication by tak-
ing advantage of a secret that only exists due to the creation of a transaction that is
stored on the Blockchain.
ZKP{w} Zero knowledge proof of knowledge of w
(V, z) Schnorr zero knowledge proof values
KDF (.) Key derivation function
Uncompress(x, sign) Uncompresses public key using x co-ordinate and sign ∈ {+,−}
(x, y) Represents a point on the elliptic curve
P Generator for the elliptic curve
(r, s) Signature pair that is stored in a transaction
A, B Alice and Bob’s bitcoin addresses: H(dP )
dA, dB Alice and Bob’s private key for their Bitcoin address
kA, kB Alice and Bob’s transaction-specific private key
k̂A, k̂B Alice and Bob’s estimated transaction-specific private key
QA, QB Alice and Bob’s transaction-specific public key
Q̂A, Q̂B Alice and Bob’s estimated transaction-specific public key
wA, wB Alice and Bob’s ephemeral private keys used for YAK
κAB Shared key for Alice and Bob
Table 1. Summary of notations and symbols
Both of these protocols will use k as a transaction-specific private key and Q =
kP as a transaction-specific public key. Diffie-Hellman-over-Bitcoin will be a non-
interactive protocol without forward secrecy and YAK-over-Bitcoin will be an inter-
active protocol with forward secrecy. All domain parameters D for both protocols
are the same as the ECDSA algorithm.
3.1 Setting the stage
We will have two actors, Alice and Bob. A single transaction TA is used by Alice
to send her payment (anonymously or not) to Bob. For our protocols, we will as-
sume that Bob has created a second transaction Tb using his ECDSA private key,
so the Blockchain contains both Alice and Bob’s ECDSA signature. This is a re-
alistic assumption as Bob naturally needs to spend the money or re-organise his
bitcoins to protect against theft. In one possible implementation, upon receiving Al-
ice’s payment, Bob can send back to Alice a tiny portion of the received amount
as acknowledgement, so his ECDSA signature is published on the blockchain (the
signature serves to prove that Bob knows the ECDSA private key). This is just one
way to ensure that the Blockchain contains both actors’ signatures, and there may
be many other methods to achieve the same.
The owner of a transaction will be required to derive the transaction-specific
private key (random nonce) k from their signature before taking part in the key
exchange protocols. For both protocols, we assume the transactions TA, TB between
Alice and Bob have been sent to the network and accepted to the Blockchain with a
depth of at least six blocks, which is considered the standard depth to rule-out the
possibility of a double-spend attack [14].
In both protocols, each user will need to extract their partner’s signature (r, s)
and attempt to derive their partner’s transaction-specific public key Q = (x, y).
Algorithm 1 demonstrates that the r value from the signature is equal to the x co-
ordinate modulo n (note that there is a subtle difference in the data range, since
r ∈ Zn and x ∈ Zq, but this has an almost negligible effect on the working of the
Blockchain contains (rA, sA) and (rB, sB) from TA and TB
Alice (A, dA) Bob (B, dB)
1. kA = (H(TA) + dArA)s
−1
A kB = (H(TB) + dBrB)s
−1
B
2. Q̂B = Uncompress(rB,+) Q̂A = Uncompress(rA,+)
3. kAQ̂B = (xAB,±yAB) kBQ̂A = (xAB,±yAB)
κ = KDF(xAB) κ = KDF(xAB)
Fig. 2. The Diffie-Hellman-over-Bitcoin Protocol
protocols as we will explain in detail in Section 5.2). However, the y co-ordinate of Q
is not stored in the transaction, and it can be either of the two values (above/below
the x axis).
We define the uncompression function as Uncompress(x, sign) by using the x co-
ordinate from their partner’s signature and the y co-ordinate’s sign ∈ {+,−}. Using
point uncompression and assuming one of the two possible signs for the y co-ordinate,
Alice or Bob will be able to derive a value Q̂ which we call the estimated transaction-
specific public key for their partner. This Q̂ could be either Q = (x, y) or its additive
inverse −Q = (x,−y). This Q̂ will correspond to the estimated transaction-specific
private key k̂, which could be either k or −k.
3.2 Authentication
Our definition of authentication will refer to data origin authentication and we will
use the Blockchain as a trusted platform for storing digital signatures. Knowledge of
the private key d for a bitcoin address or the random nonce k in a signature will prove
the identities of pseudonymous parties. We will define two concepts for authentication
using Bitcoin:
1. Bitcoin address authentication. Knowledge of the discrete log d for a Bitcoin
address.
2. Transaction authentication. Knowledge of the discrete log k from a single
digital signature in a transaction.
Bitcoin address authentication is well-known in the community and has been
used for other protocols. However, transaction authentication is a special case that
our protocols will exploit. Although k and d are equivalent in proving ownership of a
Bitcoin address or transaction, k is randomly generated for every ECDSA signature
and is unique for each new transaction.
We will show that Alice and Bob can authenticate each other based on the knowl-
edge of the k. This relies on participants trusting the integrity of the Blockchain as
the cornerstone for authentication. For an adversary to mount a man-in-the-middle
attack in this scene, he would need to perform a history-revision attack to modify
the ECDSA signatures stored in the Blockchain.
Blockchain contains (rA, sA) and (rB, sB) from TA and TB
Alice (A, dA) Bob (B, dB)
1. kA = (H(TA) + dArA)s
−1
A kB = (H(TB) + dBrB)s
−1
B
2. QA = (rA, yA) = kAP QB = (rB, yB) = kBP
3. Q̂A = Uncompress(rA,+) Q̂B = Uncompress(rB,+)
If QA = Q̂A then k̂A = kA If QB = Q̂B then k̂B = kB
else k̂A = −kA else k̂B = −kB
4. Q̂B = Uncompress(rB,+) Q̂A = Uncompress(rA,+)
5. wA ∈R [1, n− 1], WA,ZKP{wA}−−−−−−−−−−−→
wB ∈R [1, n− 1],
WA = wAP WB = wBP
WB,ZKP{wB}←−−−−−−−−−−−6. Verify ZKP{wB} Verify ZKP{wA}
7. (xAB, yAB) = (xAB, yAB) =
(k̂A + wA)(Q̂B +WB) (k̂B + wB)(Q̂A +WA)
κ = KDF(xAB) κ = KDF(xAB)
Fig. 3. YAK-over-Bitcoin Protocol
3.3 Diffie-Hellman-over-Bitcoin Protocol
Based on the concept of transaction authentication, the first protocol that we present
is ‘Diffie-Hellman-over-Bitcoin’. The protocol is non-interactive; the shared secret is
generated using the signatures from two transactions and no additional information
from the participants is required. However, forward secrecy is not provided, as we
will illustrate in the security analysis.
Figure 2 presents an outline of the protocol. Initially, each user will derive the
random nonce k from their own signatures and fetch their partner’s transaction
from the Blockchain. Each user will gain an estimation of their partner’s public
key Q̂ before using their own transaction-specific private key k to derive the shared
secret (xAB,±yAB). Regardless of whether Q̂A = ±QA (or Q̂B = ±QB), the x co-
ordinate of kBQ̂A will be the same as that of kAQ̂B. Following the Elliptic Curve
Diffie Hellman (ECDH) [20] approach, the xAB co-ordinate will be used to derive the
key KDF (xAB) = κ.
3.4 YAK-over-Bitcoin Protocol
The second protocol we present is ‘YAK-over-Bitcoin’. This is based on adapting a
PKI-based YAK key exchange protocol [12] to the Bitcoin application by removing
the dependence on a PKI and instead relying on the integrity of the Blockchain. We
chose YAK instead of others (e.g., station-to-station, MQV, HMQV, etc), as YAK
is the only PKI-based AKE protocol that requires each sender to demonstrate the
proof of knowledge of both the static and ephemeral private keys. This requirement
is important for the security proofs of our system as we will detail in Section 4. As
well, we will show in the security analysis that the protocol allows the participants
to have full forward secrecy.
Algorithm 2 Schnorr Zero Knowledge Proof Generation Algorithm
Input: Domain parameters D = (q, P, n,Curve), signer identity ID, secret value w and
public value W .
Output: (V, z)
1: Select v ∈R [1, n− 1], Compute V = vP
2: Compute h = H(D,W, V, ID)
3: Compute z = v − wh mod n
4: Return (V, z)
An outline of our protocol is presented in Figure 3. Initially, each user will follow
the same steps as seen in the previous ‘Diffie-Hellman-over-Bitcoin’ protocol to derive
their secret k and their partner’s estimated public key Q̂. However, a subtle difference
requires each user to compare their real public key Q with the estimation of their
own key Q̂ to determine if they are equal. If these public keys are different, then the
user will use the additive inverse of k as their estimated transaction-specific private
key and we will denote this choice between the two keys as k̂. This subtle change
will allow both parties to derive the same shared secret (xAB, yAB) which would be
expected in an interactive protocol without exchanging their real y co-ordinates.
Each user generates an ephemeral private key w and computes the corresponding
public key W = wP . As required in the original YAK paper [12], each user must
also construct a zero knowledge proof to prove possession of the ephemeral private
key w. These zero knowledge proofs can be sent over an insecure communication
channel to their partners. Here, we will use the same Schnorr signature as in [12]
to realise the ZKP. Details of the Schnorr ZKP are summarised in Algorithm 2 and
3. The definition of the Schnorr ZKP includes a unique signer identity ID, which
prevents an attacker replaying the ZKP back to the signer herself [12]. In our case,
we can simply use the unique r value from the user’s ECDSA signature (r, s) in the
associated Bitcoin transaction T as the user’s identity.
Once the ZKPs have been verified, each user will derive (xAB, yAB) using their
secret w, k̂, public value W and their partners’ estimated transaction-specific public
key Q̂. It should be easy to verify that although the shared secret has four different
combinations (±k̂A + wA)(±k̂B + wB)P , the secret key derived between Alice and
Bob will always be identical (due to each participant predicting the estimated public
key Q̂ that their partner will choose).
4 Security Analysis
Our protocols are based on reusing the signature-specific random value k in ECDSA
as the transaction-specific secret on which the authenticated key exchange protocol
is based. Hence, the security of both the ECDSA signature and the key exchange
protocols needs to be analysed to make sure the reusing of k is sound in terms of
security.
For the AKE protocols, following the security analysis of YAK [12], we consider
three security requirements, informally defined in the following:
Algorithm 3 Schnorr Zero Knowledge Proof Verification Algorithm
Input: Domain parameters D = (q, P, n,Curve), signer identity ID, public value W ,
Schnorr zero knowledge proof values (V, z)
Output: Valid or invalid
1: Perform public key validation for W [13]
2: Compute partners h = H(D,W, V, ID)
3: Return V
?
= zP + hW mod n
– Private key security: The adversary is unable to gain any extra2 information
about the private key of an honest party by eavesdropping her communication
with other parties, changing messages sent to her, or even participating in an
AKE protocol with her.
– Full forward secrecy: The adversary is unable to determine the shared secret
of an eavesdropped AKE session in the past between a pair of honest parties,
even if their private keys are leaked subsequently.
– Session key security: The adversary is unable to determine the shared secret
between two honest parties by eavesdropping their communication or changing
their messages.
Note that in our security arguments we consider the security of shared secrets
(xAB in Fig’s 2 and 3), as opposed to that of the subsequently calculated shared
session keys (κ in the same figures). We henceforth denote the shared secret by K,
i.e., κ = KDF(K). We require the shared secret to be hard to determine for the
adversary in the full forward secrecy and session key security requirements. A good
key derivation function (KDF) derives from such a shared secret a session key which
is indistinguishable from random. Our security proofs can be easily adapted to prove
indistinguishability based on the decisional rather than computational Diffie-Hellman
assumption.
For ECDSA signature, we require that it remains unforgeable against chosen-
message attacks despite the randomness k being reused in subsequent AKE protocols.
Although ECDSA has withstood major cryptanalysis, the security of ECDSA has
only been proven under non-standard assumptions or assuming modifications (see
[28] for a survey of these results). In our analysis, we consider extra information
available to an attacker as a result of k being reused in AKE protocols, and show
that it does not degrade the security of ECDSA.
We assume ECDSA to be a (non-interactive honest-verifier) zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge of the private key d. This is a reasonable assumption in the random
oracle model which follows the work of Malone-Lee and Smart [16]3. In practice,
2 By “extra” information, we mean information other than what is derivable from the
honest party’s already available public key.
3 Note that the results apply to a slightly modified version of ECDSA in which e = H(r|m)
where | denotes concatenation. Although the Bitcoin Core implementation is based on the
original ECDSA standard, the above modification is included in more recent standards
of ECDSA such as ISO/IEC 14888 [1]. Furthermore, as another option for signing, the
people accept bitcoin transactions only when the ECDSA signatures are verified suc-
cessfully4. Verifying the ECDSA signature is tantamount to verifying the knowledge
of the ECDSA private key d that should only be held by the legitimate bitcoin user.
We also note that given an ECDSA message-signature pair, m, (r, s), knowledge
of the private key d is equivalent to knowledge of the randomness k since given either
the other can be calculated from sk = H(m) + dr mod n.
4.1 Security of Diffie-Hellman-over-Bitcoin
This protocol is an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the public values
are bound to two transactions in the Blockchain. Private key security considers a
malicious active adversary “Mallory”, and session key security considers an eaves-
dropper adversary “Eve”. The protocol does not provide full forward secrecy. We
will provide a sketch of the proof of security for each property in the following. In
each proof, we follow the same approach as in [12] to assume an extreme adversary,
who has all the powers except those that would allow the attacker to trivially break
any key exchange protocol.
Theorem 1 (Private Key Security). Diffie-Hellman-over-Bitcoin provides pri-
vate key security under the assumption that ECDSA signature is a zero knowledge
proof of knowledge of the ECDSA secret key.
Proof (sketch). The goal of an adversary Mallory is to be able to gain some extra in-
formation on Alice’s transaction-specific private key kA through the following attack.
Mallory is given the public parameters of the system and access to the Blockchain
which includes Alice’s transaction TA, then she provides a transaction TM which is
included in the Blockchain, then she carries out a Diffie-Hellman-over-Bitcoin pro-
tocol with Alice (which is non-interactive), and eventually is able to calculate the
shared secret K. The attack is depicted in Fig. 4(i). Alice’s ECDSA signature in TA
is assumed to be zero knowledge and hence does not reveal any information about
her private key. Furthermore, since Mallory’s transaction TM includes an ECDSA
signature by her, and ECDSA signature is a proof of knowledge of Mallory’s ECDSA
secret key dM, Mallory must know dM, and hence kM. Hence, Mallory does not gain
any extra knowledge from calculating K, since knowledge of kM and Alice’s public
key enables her to simulate K on her own. uunionsq
Theorem 2 (Session Key Security). Diffie-Hellman-over-Bitcoin provides ses-
sion key security based on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption under the
Bitcoin community is considering including Schnorr signature [2], which is proven to be
a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the private key.
4 A bug in the Bitcoin implementation for the SIGHASH SINGLE flag allows the message
that is signed to authorise the transaction to be 1 instead of the hash of the transaction
[8]. This bug is not likely to be fixed in the near-future as it is consensus-critical code.
To address this bug, we assume that an implementation of our protocol properly checks
that the message signed is a hash of a valid transaction as published on the Blockchain
rather than 1.
TA TM· · · · · ·· · ·
Alice
kA
Mallory
kMK K
Bob
kB
Blockchain
i. private key security ii. session key security
TA TB· · · · · ·· · ·
Alice
kA K K
Blockchain
Fig. 4. Security of Diffie-Hellman-over-Bitcoin. Light grey denotes what the adversary (Mal-
lory in (i), Eve in (ii)) knows. Dark grey denotes what the adversary (Mallory) chooses.
assumption that ECDSA signature is a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of the
ECDSA secret key.
Proof (sketch). Assume there is a successful adversary Eve that is able to calculate
the shared secret K for a key exchange between two honest parties Alice and Bob,
without knowing either Alice or Bob’s transaction-specific secret keys, kA or kB. The
attack is depicted in Fig. 4(ii). Note that since the protocol is non-interactive, the
adversary is reduced to a passive adversary. A successful attack would contradict
the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption since given an instance of the
CDH problem (P, αP, βP ), one is able to leverage Eve and solve the CDH problem by
setting up Alice and Bob’s transaction-specific secrets as kA = α and kB = β, which
results in K = αβP . A successful Eve implies that CDH can be solved efficiently. uunionsq
4.2 Security of YAK-over-Bitcoin
This protocol is an Elliptic Curve YAK key exchange and the public values are bound
to two transactions in the Blockchain. Private key security and session key security
consider a malicious active adversary “Mallory”, and full forward secrecy considers
an eavesdropper adversary “Eve”. Similar as before, we assume an extreme adversary
who has all the powers except those that would trivially allow the attacker to break
any key exchange protocol. Under this assumption, we provide a sketch of the proof
of security for each property in the following.
Theorem 3 (Private Key Security). YAK-over-Bitcoin provides private key se-
curity under the assumption that ECDSA signature is a zero knowledge proof of
knowledge of the ECDSA secret key.
Proof (sketch). The goal of an adversary Mallory is to be able to gain some extra in-
formation on Alice’s transaction-specific private key kA through the following attack.
Mallory is given the public parameters of the system and access to the Blockchain
which includes Alice’s transaction TA, then she provides a transaction TM which is in-
cluded in the Blockchain, then she carries out a YAK-over-Bitcoin protocol with Alice,
in which Alice sends the message (wAP,ZKP{wA}) and Mallory sends the message
(wMP,ZKP{wM}). Alice’s ephemeral secret wA is also assumed to be leaked to Mal-
lory. The attack is depicted in Fig. 5(i). Alice’s ECDSA signature in TA is assumed to
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wMP,ZKP{wM}
TA TM· · · · · ·· · ·
Alice
wAkA
Mallory
wMkM
wAP,ZKP{wA}
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TA TB· · · · · ·· · ·
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wMP,ZKP{wM}
TA TB· · · · · ·· · ·
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Fig. 5. Security of YAK-over-Bitcoin. Light grey denotes what the adversary (Mallory in
(i) and (iii), Eve in (ii)) knows. Dark grey denotes what the adversary (Mallory) chooses.
be zero knowledge and hence does not reveal any information about her private key.
Furthermore, since the ECDSA signature in Mallory’s transaction and her message
in the protocol are proofs of knowledge of dM (equivalently kM) and wM, respectively,
Mallory must know both kM and wM. Note that she receives (wAP,ZKP{wA}) and
wA and hence will be able to calculate K = (kM+wM)(kAP +wAP ). Hence, Mallory
does not gain any extra knowledge from the values she receives, since wA is indepen-
dent of kA and knowledge of wA, kM, and wM enables Mallory to simulate all the
values she receives. uunionsq
Theorem 4 (Full Forward Secrecy). YAK-over-Bitcoin provides full forward se-
crecy based on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Proof (sketch). Assume there is a successful adversary Eve that is able to calculate
the shared secret K for a previous key exchange between two honest parties Alice
and Bob through the following attack. Both Alice and Bob’s transaction-specific
secret keys kA and kB are assumed to be leaked to Eve. Eve is also assumed to have
access to all the protocol messages exchanged between Alice and Bob, as well as
the Blockchain of course. The attack is depicted in Fig. 5(ii). Given an instance of
the CDH problem (P, αP, βP ) one is able to leverage Eve and solve the problem as
follows. The protocol is set up with the ephemeral secret values wA = α and wB = β
and all other parameters as per the protocol description. When Eve calculates K, the
value S = K−kAkBP −kA(βP )−kB(αP ) is calculated and returned as the solution
to the CDH problem. Note that since K = (kA +wA)(kB +wB)P , we have S = αβP .
A successful Eve implies that CDH can be solved efficiently. uunionsq
Theorem 5 (Session Key Security). YAK-over-Bitcoin provides session key se-
curity based on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption under the assumption
that ECDSA signature is a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of the ECDSA secret
key.
Proof (sketch). Assume there is a successful adversary Mallory that is able to cal-
culate the shared secret K for a key exchange between two honest parties Alice and
Bob through the following attack by impersonating Bob to Alice. Alice believes she
is interacting with Bob, whereas in reality she is interacting with an impersonator
Mallory who replaces Bob’s message in the protocol with her own (wMP,ZKP{wM}).
Alice’s transaction-specific secret key kA is assumed to be leaked to Mallory as well.
However, Mallory does not know Bob’s transaction-specific secret key kB. The attack
is depicted in Fig. 5(iii). Given an instance of the CDH problem (P, αP, βP ) one is
able to leverage Mallory and solve the problem as follows. The protocol is set up
with Alice’s ephemeral secret wA = α and Bob’s transaction-specific secret kB = β
and all other parameters as per the protocol description. When Mallory calculates
K, the value S = K−kAwBP −wA(βP )−wB(αP ) is calculated and returned as the
solution to the CDH problem. Note that since K = (kA + wA)(kB + wB)P , we have
S = αβP . A successful Mallory implies that CDH can be solved efficiently. uunionsq
4.3 Security of ECDSA Signatures
Diffie-Hellman-over-Bitcoin is a non-interactive protocol and the protocol partici-
pants do not send any messages to each other that would potentially have an impact
on the security of ECDSA signatures.
In ‘YAK-over-Bitcoin’, the messages that the protocol participants send each
other include information about their ephemeral keys wA and wB only, which are
chosen independently of all the secret values related to the ECDSA signatures in TA
and TB. As shown in Theorem 3 in Section 4.2, the protocol does not reveal any
information about the static private key (i.e., k), and hence not any information
about the ECDSA private key (i.e., d) since the two values are linearly related. One
can compute d from k, or vice versa. The key element in the proof of Theorem 3 is that
each party is required to demonstrate knowledge of both the static and ephemeral
keys. This also explains our choice of the YAK protocol, as YAK is the only PKI-
based AKE protocol that has the requirement that each party must demonstrate the
proof of knowledge for both the static and ephemeral keys (the former is realized by
the Proof of Possession at the Certificate Authority registration while the later is
achieved by Schnorr Non-interactive ZKP).
5 Implementation
Our implementation is a modification of the Bitcoin Core client and is considered a
proof of concept. We have included three new remote procedure commands (RPC)
that will allow the client to perform a non-interactive Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
generate a zero knowledge proof to be shared with their partner and verify a partner’s
zero knowledge proof before revealing the shared secret. Our modified implementation
was executed using the -txindex parameter which allows us to query the Blockchain
and retrieve the raw transaction data.
Step Description Time
Diffie-Hellman-over-Bitcoin
1-2 Compute kA and Q̂B 0.08 ms
3 Compute shared secret KAB and key κAB 0.51 ms
Total: 0.59 ms
YAK-over-Bitcoin
1-4 Compute kA, QA, Q̂A and Q̂B 0.53 ms
5 Compute wA,WA and ZKP{wA} 0.90 ms
6 Verify Bob’s ZKP{wB} 0.69 ms
7 Compute shared secret KAB and key κAB 0.43 ms
Total: 2.55 ms
Table 2. Alice performing YAK-over-Bitcoin
Two transactions were created using a non-modified implementation on the 10th
December, 2013 to allow us to test our key exchange on the real network. All tests
were carried out a MacBook Pro mid-2012 running OS X 10.9.1 with 2.3GHz Intel
Core i7 and 4 cores and 16 GB DDR3 RAM. Each protocol is executed 100 times
from Alice’s perspective and the average times are reported.
5.1 Time analysis
Preliminary steps for both protocols involve fetching the transactions from the Blockchain
0.04 ms and retrieving the signatures (r, s) stored in the transaction 0.08 ms. Overall,
these steps on average require 0.12 ms.
This ‘Diffie-Hellman-over-Bitcoin’ protocol is non-interactive as participants are
not required to exchange information before deriving the shared secret. Table 2
demonstrates an average time of 0.08 ms to derive Alice’s transaction-specific private
key kA and Bob’s estimated public key Q̂B and 0.051 ms to compute the shared key
κAB. Overall, on average the protocol executes in 0.59 ms which is reasonable for
real-life use.
The ‘YAK-over-Bitcoin’ protocol is interactive as it requires each party to send
an ephemeral public key together with a non-interactive Schnorr ZKP to prove the
knowledge of the ephemeral private key. Table 2 shows that computing and verify-
ing zero knowledge proofs is the most time-consuming operation. However, a total
execution time of 2.55 ms is still reasonable for practical applications.
5.2 Note about domain parameters
Our investigation highlighted that q > n as seen in [6] which could obscure the
relationship between k and r as the x co-ordinate can wrap around n. However, the
probability that this may occur can be calculated as (q − n)/q ≈ 4 × 10−39 and
is unlikely to occur in practice. However, in the rare chance that this does happen
then it is easily resolved by r′ = r + n. This does not require any modification to
the underlying signature code as it is simply an addition of the publicly available r
with the modulus n. Once resolved, both parties can continue with the protocol. For
reference, q and n are defined below:
q=FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE FFFFFC2F
n=FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE BAAEDCE6 AF48A03B BFD25E8C D0364141
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated transaction authentication by using the digital
signatures stored in Bitcoin transactions to bootstrap key exchange. We proposed
two protocols to allow for interactive and non-interactive key exchange, the latter
offering an additional property of forward-secrecy. We encourage the community to
try our proof-of-concept implementation and to take advantage of this new form of
authentication to enable end-to-end secure communication between Bitcoin users.
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